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1  Introduction
The new constitutional dispensation brought with it (inevitably) large scale 
deviations in the way remedies in the context of evictions are applied in modern 
South African law. The problem that is particularly interesting – especially in 
light of recent jurisprudence – is the extent, if any, to which remedies are 
applied in the same way as they were before the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”) was enacted, especially in instances 
where constitutional rights are infringed and an appropriate remedy is sought. 
The question that seems to have become relevant is whether there is – or 
should be – a methodological approach in determining the decision of which 
remedy to apply for to ensure that constitutional rights are adequately given 
effect to. This has become especially important in instances where more than 
one remedy deriving from different sources of law could apply in a particular 
case. Are litigants then free to choose common-law remedies in instances 
where (constitutional) rights are infringed, and in response to that, are courts 
able to deny those remedies and rather create constitutional ones instead? 
It has always been crucial to consider the place (or role) of common-law 
remedies in a constitutional dispute. Additionally, it has become essential to 
determine the possibility of direct reliance on a constitutional right (to create a 
remedy) in applications brought purely on the basis of common-law remedies.
One place where the questions raised above are particularly interesting 
is in the area of eviction law. The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”) was enacted to give 
effect to the constitutional right not to be arbitrarily evicted from one’s home.1 
The Act ensures that procedural requirements are met in the case of eviction 
of unlawful occupiers.2 PIE also guarantees substantive safeguards over and 
* I would like to thank André van der Walt and Juanita Pienaar for reading drafts of this article. Remaining 
errors are my own.
1 See JM Pienaar & A Muller “The Impact of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 on Homelessness and Unlawful Occupation within the Present 
Statutory Framework” (1999) 10 Stell LR 370-396, which highlights that although PIE adequately 
addresses the prevention of the illegal eviction in terms of s 26(3), it does not fulfil its purpose of ensuring 
the prevention of unlawful occupation of land and homelessness. See also JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
“Uitsettings onder die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet: Die Verhouding tussen artikel 25(1), artikel 26(3) en 
die Uitsettingswet” (2006) TSAR 277 283, where the authors question the role and function of the Act. 
They consider the purpose of the Act in terms of the aims as set out in the Act itself, but also with regard 
to various cases that have tried to provide clarity in terms of the main purposes of the Act.
2 AJ van der Walt Property in the Margins (2009) 148.
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above the procedural controls.3 Unfortunately, what has been on the increase 
lately is municipalities evicting (or attempting to evict) unlawful occupiers 
without following the procedures as set out in PIE. This was not at all an 
uncommon occurrence in the pre-constitutional era, where “the tendency by 
the municipalities of the time was to deliberately destroy the building materials 
so as to prevent the use of the mandament van spolie in these instances”.4 
One would have thought that evictions of this nature would become a thing 
of the past under the constitutional dispensation, especially given section 
26(3) of the Constitution and PIE.5 However, what has surfaced lately are 
large scale suspect evictions effected by municipalities without the necessary 
procedures having been followed. My specific concern in these instances is 
the possible remedies that may be triggered (and available to evictees) when 
an infringement of this nature occurs.
In an earlier publication, Pienaar and I highlighted the continued relevance 
of the common-law remedy of the mandament van spolie in eviction cases.6 
We specifically noted how ironic it was that we still see common-law remedies 
being resorted to in order to highlight the predicament of the homeless and 
vulnerable, despite section 26(3) of the Constitution and the fact that PIE was 
specifically enacted to give effect to the right not to be arbitrarily evicted from 
your home.7 Our first conclusion was that it is clear from pre-constitutional 
jurisprudence that the spoliation remedy was regularly used following 
evictions to restore possession and effectively return people to their homes 
and shelters. However, where the building materials with which the homes 
were erected were destroyed, the applicants sometimes ran into difficulties 
with the applicability of the remedy. Nonetheless, to a large extent issues 
like homelessness and vulnerability were brought to the fore when courts 
3 See Van der Walt Property in the Margins 149, who states that “[t]he substantive requirements identify 
the social and political background of the housing shortage and the social and personal circumstances of 
the occupiers as factors that have to be considered before an eviction order is granted, thereby indicating 
that the Act brings about a significant qualification for the rights paradigm”. See also JM Pienaar Land 
Reform (2013) ch 10 (forthcoming).
4 ZT Boggenpoel & JM Pienaar “The Continued Relevance of the mandament van spolie: Recent 
Developments relating to Dispossession and Eviction” (2013) De Jure 998 1012:
“The 1977 Amendment to PISA further strengthened the position of local authorities, in that it 
precluded claimants from applying for civil remedies in response to demolitions of buildings or 
structures or the removal of materials or contents from the structures, unless the claimants could prove 
lawful title or a right to the land. This severely limited the courts’ power to grant the mandament van 
spolie in favour of unlawful occupiers whose properties were seized upon and destroyed. It is thus clear 
that the link between dispossession and eviction and subsequent possessory remedies and statutory 
responses thereto has been part-and-parcel of the South-African landscape for many years.”
5 The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 72 of 1977 (“PISA”). Blecher writes that this 
legislative intervention was a “swift and harsh” intervention by the legislative authority in response to 
Fredericks v Stellenbosch Divisional Council 1977 3 SA 113 (K). See MD Blecher “Spoliation and the 
Demolition of Legal Rights” (1978) 95 SALJ 8 13. In this regard, the tendency by the municipalities of 
the time was to deliberately destroy the building materials so as to prevent the use of the mandament 
van spolie in these instances. The 1977 Amendment to PISA (s 3B(4)(a)) further strengthened the 
position of local authorities, in that it precluded claimants from applying for civil remedies in response to 
demolitions of buildings or structures or the removal of materials or contents from the structures, unless 
the claimants could prove lawful title or a right to the land. This severely limited the courts’ power to 
grant the mandament van spolie in favour of unlawful occupiers whose properties were seized upon and 
destroyed.
6 Boggenpoel & Pienaar (2013) De Jure 998-1021.
7 998-1021.
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were forced to engage with claims for restoration following dispossession, 
which otherwise may never have been considered in the presence of the then 
applicable law regulating unlawful occupation of land, namely the Prevention 
of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (“PISA”). Secondly, we showed that even 
despite section 26(3) and PIE, litigants in the constitutional era are still seeking 
common-law relief to bring the same issues of homelessness and vulnerability 
to the fore. In this regard, it was concluded that not much has changed and 
that consequently the remedy is still relevant in some instances in so far as 
it shows the plight of vulnerable occupiers who are unlawfully evicted by 
various acts of dispossession. In light of the fact that PIE by its very nature is a 
reactive legislative tool for ensuring constitutionally compliant evictions, PIE 
arguably presents shortcomings that in effect provide limited remedial options 
for unlawful occupiers if PIE is not pleaded ex ante. As a result, litigants 
are forced to resort to common-law remedies to obtain restoration of their 
homes in instances where PIE procedures were disregarded. The purpose for 
recalling that publication here is that it has provided the platform for engaging 
in another series of important questions concerning the source of law that 
provides remedial response for constitutional infringements. Therefore, I 
will use some of the cases in the eviction context – that were specifically 
highlighted in that publication – as the starting point to the issue I wish to 
discuss in this article.
It will first be necessary to briefly recap some decisions that have necessitated 
the questions that I have raised above. These cases (dealing with evictions or 
purported evictions) illustrate the need to critically determine whether a new 
methodology is required in the case of remedies in modern South African law. 
Therefore, the first part below sets out two decisions with the aim of analysing 
how each respective court went about dealing with the relationship between 
the common law and the Constitution as far as remedies are concerned. It is 
clear that in both instances the respective appellants had a choice between 
either instituting a common-law remedy or relying directly on a constitutional 
right to found a remedy. The reason for using these decisions is to specifically 
focus on instances where the possibility arose that more than one source of 
law could provide a remedy in the particular case.8 It is interesting to see 
which remedy the parties opted for and also to observe how the particular 
court went about dealing with the interplay between the sources of law in the 
quest for an appropriate remedy.
Thereafter, I set out the constitutional provisions that aim to provide clarity 
in terms of the source of law that should be used when attempting to find 
redress in the case of infringement of constitutional rights. The penultimate 
part of the article provides selected perspectives on remedies for violations of 
constitutional rights, especially in view of the body of common-law remedies 
that seemingly coexist with the new cures provided by the Constitution. 
The need to find appropriate remedial responses in these situations has 
8 I recognise that there may be more cases that illustrate the same point; however, for present purposes the 
discussion of these cases suffices because my point can be made just as well by only focusing on these 
two decisions.
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been emphasised by many authors. Some views, perceptions and “angles 
of approach”9 are discussed in this part with the aim of determining 
whether it is necessary to rethink the way we approach remedies in light 
of the Constitution. Incorporated in the discussion are some cases that 
indicate a vision of a move towards establishing an approach to remedies for 
constitutional infringement. These cases were specifically selected because 
they seem to provide an implicit – if not direct – vision for the way remedies 
should currently be approached and decided in view of the Constitution.
Finally, I attempt to provide some thoughts on the possible way forward as 
far as remedies are concerned. Specifically, I question whether common-law 
remedies – specially the mandament van spolie – can still play a valuable 
role in responding to illegal evictions, or whether direct reliance on a 
constitutional remedy in terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution provides 
better protection to evictees. In my view, this reflection is critical if we are to 
ensure that the project of “the achievement of equality, democracy and social 
justice envisaged by the Constitution”10 remains more than mere rhetoric in 
the case of eviction of unlawful occupiers.
2  Some examples highlighting the problem
In Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation v City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality11 (“Tswelopele”), the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) had 
to deal with the application for a common-law remedy (the mandament van 
spolie) in instances where constitutional rights were infringed. In this decision, 
occupiers of a vacant piece of land in a Pretoria suburb were evicted from their 
homes and their homes were demolished. It was clear that the peremptory 
eviction proceedings in PIE were not followed. The appellants (as their choice 
of remedy) opted for restoration of possession of their homes in terms of the 
common-law spoliation remedy and for provision of temporary shelter to the 
destitute occupiers in terms of their rights under sections 25 and 26(3) of the 
Constitution. Therefore, Tswelopele provides an interesting combination of 
the common-law remedy (the mandament van spolie), the constitutional right 
violated (being section 26(3)) and the legislation (PIE) specifically enacted 
to give effect to the constitutional right. This makes methodological analysis 
from the perspective of remedies interesting.
The High Court held that the mandament was appropriate only for 
restoration of possession and not for rebuilding of the demolished structures. 
Similarly, the SCA doubted whether the common law spoliation remedy was 
available in cases where officials had – during an (illegal) eviction – destroyed 
the materials that were used in the construction of the dwellings. In this 
9 This phrase is used by André van der Walt in his development of the subsidiarity principles that aim to 
indicate the point of departure that should be used when deciding which source of law to turn to when a 
dispute arises. For the use of the phrase in this context, see AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution 
(2012) 37. However, the term comes from a novel by NS Ndebele The Cry of Winnie Mandela (2003) 
81-82, and was first used in the context of law by Henk Botha (H Botha “Refusal, Post-apartheid 
Constitutionalism” in K van Marle (ed) Refusal, Transition and Post-apartheid Law (2009) 34).
10 FI Michelman “Expropriation, Eviction and the Gravity of the Common Law” (2013) 24 Stell LR 245 246.
11 Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2007 6 SA 511 (SCA).
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regard, it was found that the main objective of the common-law remedy is 
to temporarily restore physical control and enjoyment of property and not its 
rebuilt equivalent.12 Therefore, the SCA focused on the possessory nature of 
the spoliation remedy and in this light the possibility of using replacement 
materials to rebuild the occupiers’ homes was specifically excluded in terms 
of the traditional application of the remedy.13 The Court refused to permit 
the type of development that would allow for the remedy to be applicable in 
these instances, because that would force the common law – specifically the 
common-law remedies – to perform a constitutional function.14 Therefore, 
the pivotal question in Tswelopele was whether it would be appropriate to 
develop an existing common-law remedy to give effect to constitutional rights 
and values, or whether it would be more suitable to produce a new remedy in 
terms of the Constitution.15
It is clear that what the unlawful occupiers wanted was reoccupation of 
their homes from which they were evicted – and which were demolished – 
without the municipality having followed lawful eviction proceedings. In 
order to achieve this, the appellants relied on the common-law spoliation 
remedy to force the municipality to place them in the same position they were 
in prior to the dispossession. However, the common-law remedy was denied 
because the homes were demolished and the remedy could not – according 
to the Court – be used in these instances. Moreover, the Court highlighted 
that the common-law remedy could not be developed either so that it could 
be applicable in these instances. Having decided that none of the existing 
remedies – including the mandament van spolie – provided the occupiers with 
suitable protection, the SCA was forced to skilfully construct a constitutional 
remedy. Accordingly, the case was decided on the basis of direct reliance on 
constitutional rights that were infringed because PIE was not followed.16
Van der Walt argues that this was a missed opportunity for the Court.17 
Although he is hesitant to criticise the outcome, he disapproves of the 
Tswelopele decision for the uncertainty that it causes with regard to remedies in 
general.18 Van der Walt asserts that devising a new (constitutional) remedy was 
unnecessary and unfortunate in these circumstances, especially considering 
that the Court neglected to give any indication concerning the limits, scope 
or effects of the new remedy. Similarly, Sandra Liebenberg agrees that the 
“judgment does not provide general guidance on the types of considerations 




15 Para 26. See also S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 338.
16 It must be mentioned that very little in the case deals with the legislation itself, which is probably 
understandable considering that PIE does not actually provide a remedy in instances where illegal 
evictions result because its provisions are not followed.
17 AJ van der Walt “Developing the Law on Unlawful Squatting and Spoliation” (2008) 125 SALJ 24-36.
18 35.
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through the development of existing common-law remedies, or the crafting of 
an entirely new constitutional cause of action”.19
The specific (although implicit) vision of how remedies should be seen in 
relation to one another – as illustrated in Tswelopele – serves as an important 
flag if one wants to start engaging with questions of the (appropriate) 
relationship between the common law and the Constitution as far as remedies 
are concerned. Before I elaborate, it is worthwhile to first discuss another 
decision in which the interplay between the common-law remedy and the 
Constitution was again emphasised.
In the Constitutional Court decision of Schubart Park Residents’ 
Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality20 (“Schubart Park”), 
the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality again expelled unlawful occupiers 
from a badly run-down and significantly deteriorated residential complex in 
Pretoria without following any eviction or evacuation laws. The residential 
complex is owned by the City of Tshwane, which initially rented the units of 
the complex to various occupiers, but during the period from 1999 (when the 
City became the owner of the complex) to 2011 (when the litigation in this 
matter began) the building had become severely dilapidated. Furthermore, the 
City was unaware of exactly who occupied the property. Accordingly, the City 
disconnected both the water and electricity supplies to the complex and the 
occupiers protested against the disconnection. These protests quickly erupted 
into violence and even resulted in a fire breaking out in one of the blocks 
of the complex. Consequently, the police and fire brigade officers removed 
some of the residents from the complex. Although legal representatives acting 
on behalf of the residents tried to negotiate with City officials to ensure for 
the return of the residents to the complex, the negotiations were unsuccessful 
and the occupiers brought an urgent application in the North Gauteng High 
Court for an order allowing them to reoccupy their homes in terms of the 
mandament van spolie. Therefore, comparable to the Tswelopele residents, 
the occupiers in Schubart Park sought restoration on the basis that they were 
spoliated of possession of their homes.21 This application was dismissed.22
In the Constitutional Court the applicants again sought restoration on 
the basis of the spoliation remedy.23 It is interesting that the occupiers – in 
a similar fashion to the appellants in the Tswelopele decision – elected to 
follow the route of the mandament van spolie to obtain repossession of their 
19 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 338.
20 2013 1 SA 323 (CC).
21 Schubart Park Residents’ Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2013 1 SA 323 (CC) 
para 22.
22 Para 9. The following day the order concerning the provision of temporary arrangements was kept in 
place and parties were ordered to “take further steps in an attempt to reach agreement on unresolved 
issues”.
23 Para 22.
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homes.24 It should be noted that the obstacle that arose in the application for 
the mandament in this case was different from that in the Tswelopele decision. 
In Schubart Park the residential complex was still standing after the eviction 
and the question of using alternative materials to restore possession was not 
an issue at all, which it was in Tswelopele.
However, the Constitutional Court in Schubart Park dismissed the 
application for the mandament van spolie. According to the Court, merely 
restoring possession of the residential complex – in terms of the common-law 
remedy – would not meet constitutional standards in light of section 26(3).25 
Hence, an order for restoration would allow the residents to return to the 
complex and possibly endanger their lives because of the assumed horrendous 
state of the building, which the Court was unwilling to order. Therefore, 
although both requirements for the spoliation remedy were in principle 
complied with in Schubart Park, the Court nonetheless refused to grant the 
remedy because reoccupation of the homes was impossible as a result of the 
deteriorated and unsafe state of the complex.26
What is interesting about Schubart Park – and also the place where I draw 
parallels with the Tswelopele decision – is the Court’s reasoning as far as 
remedies are concerned. Firstly, the Court recognised that if the mandament 
van spolie was not the appropriate remedy – and if it could not be developed 
to be the appropriate remedy – the occupiers would be left without a remedy in 
a case where there was clearly an infringement of section 26(3) rights. In this 
regard, the Constitutional Court followed the approach adopted in Tswelopele 
and upheld the distinction between the spoliation remedy (with its possessory 
function and its being presumably unable to perform a constitutional one) and 
a remedy under section 38 of the Constitution aimed at ensuring appropriate 
relief in the case of constitutional infringement.
Froneman J stated that a spoliation order would only give the occupiers 
factual possession and possible return of the status quo and it would not 
in itself directly determine – or entrench – constitutional rights.27 In this 
respect, the Court correctly emphasised that spoliation proceedings merely set 
the scene for the subsequent determination of (constitutional) rights in relation 
24 Pienaar and I argue that a possible reason for the choice of remedy in both cases may be twofold: In the 
first place the occupier might choose the mandament van spolie because it is a speedy remedy. Another 
possible reason is the fact that PIE is preventative rather than reactive. Therefore, PIE cannot in itself ex 
post facto remedy an eviction that was not undertaken lawfully; whereas the spoliation remedy is by its 
very nature reactive and restorative. Consequently, if someone has unlawfully dispossessed another, the 
possession should be restored ante omnia. See Boggenpoel & Pienaar (2013) De Jure 1018.
25 Schubart Park Residents’ Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2013 1 SA 323 (CC) 
paras 22, 30. This is similar to Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation v City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality 2007 6 SA 511 (SCA) para 26, where the SCA stressed that the common-law remedy should 
not be forced to perform a constitutional function.
26 Schubart Park Residents’ Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2013 1 SA 323 (CC) 
para 19.
27 Para 29. This is because the remedy is a temporary one that ensures that possession is restored before 
rights are considered. This is emphasised by the maxim of spoliatus ante omnia restituendus est, which 
forms the basis of the remedy. See J Taitz “Spoliation Proceedings and the ‘grubby-handed’ Possessor” 
(1981) 98 SALJ 36 40; DG Kleyn Die mandament van spolie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg LLD thesis 
University of Pretoria (1986) 300; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 121.
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to property.28 Therefore, the spoliation remedy would not (and according to 
the Court, could not) vindicate the occupiers’ rights in terms of section 26(3). 
Their rights were clearly infringed when eviction or evacuation proceedings 
were disregarded and therefore restoration of factual possession of the 
property on the basis of the spoliation remedy would not be appropriate relief 
according to section 38 of the Constitution. For that reason, even if the two 
requirements for the spoliation remedy were proven, it could not be granted.29
To sum up, it seems as though the Court was suggesting (probably correctly) 
that the common-law remedy could only do so much when evictions occur 
contrary to due process. It could only provide factual restoration; nothing 
more and nothing less. Certainly, the reasoning of the Court indicates that 
the common-law remedy could not provide the type of protection that the 
Constitution requires in these particular instances. However, if the Court 
stopped there – in other words just denying the common-law remedy – it 
would have allowed an outcome that would not adequately have given effect 
to section 26(3) of the Constitution.30 This is especially so in light of the fact 
that PIE was not followed and none of the legislative mechanisms that allow 
for removal, evacuation or eviction of people from their homes was applied 
either.31 Therefore, subsequent to finding that the common-law remedy was 
inadequate in both cases – because it could not provide apt constitutional 
protection in these instances (and I might add, could not be developed to do 
so) – the Court was forced to provide a constitutional remedy under section 
38 in order to rectify the violations that had taken place because of the blatant 
disregard for eviction proceedings.
In both these decisions, the respective courts’ emphasis on the need to find 
adequate redress in the case of violations of constitutional rights is striking. 
In this regard, it was always clear in both Tswelopele and Schubart Park 
that the courts were looking for a way to adequately remedy the harms that 
had taken place; the only question was which remedy would appropriately 
facilitate that.32 What is remarkable is that both courts felt more comfortable 
28 Schubart Park Residents’ Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2013 1 SA 323 (CC) 
para 29. See also Bon Quelle (Edms) Bpk v Munisipaliteit van Otavi 1989 1 SA 508 (A) 513H; Kleyn Die 
mandament van spolie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 300-301, 395. Interestingly, in Van Wyk v Kleynhans 
1969 1 SA 221 (GW) 224A-B, the Court emphasised that the parties will essentially determine what 
nature the order will take. In so far as the court decides the mandament van spolie dispute, the order will 
be permanent if the parties cannot reach agreement after the order or if there is no subsequent judgment on 
the merits. Therefore, according to the Court the parties decide what character the eventual mandament 
van spolie order will take.
29 Schubart Park Residents’ Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2013 1 SA 323 (CC) 
paras 29-30.
30 Paras 18, 34, 40.
31 The legislation that the Court mentions that could have been used, but was not, include: PIE; the 
Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 (specifically s 54); the National Building Regulations and Building 
Standards Act 103 of 1977 (specifically s 12 and reg A15); GN R 2378 in GG 127 of 12-10-1990; the City 
of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, Fire Brigade Services By-Laws, published under LAN 267 in 
Gauteng Provincial Gazette 42 of 09-02-2005 (specifically s 11(2)).
32 In Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2007 6 SA 511 
(SCA), the SCA stated:
“As counsel for the appellants pointed out, effective relief must be speedy, and it must address the 
consequences of the breach of their rights. The only way to achieve these aims is to vindicate the 
occupiers’ salvage claim, and to require the respondents to re-create their shelters. The remaining 
question is the best route to that result.” See specifically, para 19.
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to do so in terms of section 38 of the Constitution rather than applying or 
altering common-law remedies in line with its constitutional obligations as 
emphasised below.33
Interestingly, both Tswelopele and Schubart Park illustrate a point that 
Wim Trengove makes concerning the discretion that courts have in terms 
of remedies in line with their constitutional mandate. Trengove argues 
that “a court’s choice of remedy in the case where a fundamental right has 
been violated or threatened, is determined only by what is just, equitable 
and appropriate”.34 Therefore, in principle a court has a wide discretion to 
determine, on the basis of justice, equity and appropriateness, what would 
be the most suitable remedy in the particular case. This is in line with the 
reasoning of the Court in Schubart Park in terms of which the remedy that is 
granted must meet constitutional remedial standards (in line with section 38), 
which a purely restorative finding (in terms of the spoliation remedy) could 
not do.
Trengove maintains that adjudication of constitutional rights – specifically 
socio-economic rights – requires the development of new and more effective 
remedies in light of the special features that typically accompany socio-
economic adjudication.35 However, he states that socio-economic rights are 
not unique and therefore they do not necessarily require unique remedies. 
Accordingly, there may be instances where “conventional remedies” may be 
used to ensure that rights are adequately given effect to, but courts may also 
have to be innovative and create novel remedies in order to ensure adequate 
enforcement of the rights in the Bill of Rights. He relies on the dictum of Fose 
v Minister of Safety and Security36 where Ackermann J stated:
“In our context an appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy, for without effective remedies 
for breach, the values underlying and the right entrenched in the constitution cannot properly be 
upheld or enhanced. Particularly, in a country where so few have the means to enforce their rights 
through the courts, it is essential that on occasions when the legal process does establish that an 
infringement of an entrenched right has occurred, it be effectively vindicated. The courts have a 
particular responsibility in this regard and are obliged to ‘forge new tools’ and shape innovative 
remedies, if needs be, to achieve this goal.”37
An interesting recent illustration of the use of conventional remedies to 
ensure that socio-economic rights are given effect to is the decision of 
the Constitutional Court in Motswagae v Rustenberg Local Municipality 
33 See Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2007 6 SA 511 
(SCA) para 26; Schubart Park Residents’ Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2013 
1 SA 323 (CC) para 29; Michelman (2013) Stell LR 259, where Michelman questions the conservatism 
of South African judges and lawyers when it comes to developing the common law in line with the 
Constitution.
34 W Trengove “Judicial Remedies for Violations of Socio-economic Rights” (1991) 1 ESR Review 8 9.
35 9.
36 1997 3 SA 786 (C).
37 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (C).
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(“Motswagae”).38 Here, the appellant sought an interdict,39 but the case was 
clearly decided on the basis of section 26(3). In Motswagae, the applicants 
were occupants of state-owned land. The buildings on the land were neglected 
and the government was in the process of redeveloping the land in line with 
its constitutional obligations. However, this required that the housing that 
was currently on the land had to be demolished. The Municipality tried to 
negotiate with the community to redevelop the land, but they were unable 
to reach consensus concerning the proposed redevelopment. Negotiations 
about alternative accommodation were also unsuccessful. Consequently, the 
Municipality ordered the second respondent (a service provider) to commence 
with construction work on the land. This resulted in excavations right next to 
the first applicant’s home that left the foundations of her home exposed. The 
applicants applied for an interdict in the High Court, which was refused on the 
basis that they did not have a clear right as required for an interdict. Both the 
High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal denied the applicants leave to 
appeal, which resulted in the application to the Constitutional Court.
The Constitutional Court held that the Municipality’s interference with 
the occupiers’ peaceful and undisturbed occupation of their homes without 
a court order caused infringement of section 26(3) of the Constitution.40 In 
this regard, the eviction that resulted did not have to cause the occupiers to 
be expelled from their homes. The Court highlighted that any attenuation or 
obliteration of the incidents of occupation would be sufficient to constitute 
eviction, which would have to be lawful.41 Interestingly, the Court noted that 
the offer of alternative accommodation by the Municipality was indicative 
of the extent of the interference that the construction works would have on 
the occupants’ rights to inhabit their homes peacefully.42 Therefore, the 
Court granted the interdict on the basis that the applicants had the right to 
undisturbed and peaceful occupation of their homes in terms of section 26(3); 
38 2013 2 SA 613 (CC).
39 It is interesting that although the applicants sought an interdict, they could very well have sought the 
mandament van spolie, specifically considering the interesting use of the words “peaceful and undisturbed 
occupation” of the property as the right that the occupiers had for purposes of the first requirement for 
an interdict. See specifically Motswagae v Rustenberg Local Municipality 2013 2 SA 613 (CC) para 18. 
See also ZT Boggenpoel “Property Law” (2013) 1 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.2.1; AJ van der Walt 
“Constitutional Property Law” (2013) 1 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.2.
40 Motswagae v Rustenberg Local Municipality 2013 2 SA 613 (CC) para 9. The uncharacteristic use of the 
words “peaceful and undisturbed occupation of homes” to describe the right that the occupiers have in 
terms of s 26(3) of the Constitution is noteworthy. These words are almost identical to the words “peaceful 
and undisturbed possession of property” which is commonly accepted as the first requirement for the 
spoliation remedy, which is interesting if one considers the debate concerning whether the mandament 
van spolie is available in instances of mere disturbances of property as opposed to total dispossession of 
property. See Van der Merwe Sakereg 148; JC Sonnekus “Eggenote, Medebesit en die Mandament van 
Spolie” (1978) 95 SALJ 217; JC Sonnekus “Fredericks and another v Stellenbosch Divisional Council 
1977 3 SA 113 K” (1978) TSAR 168 169; MJ de Waal “Naidoo v Moodley 1982 4 SA 82 (T)” (1984) 47 
THRHR 118; AJ van der Walt “Mandament van spolie – ‘n Interdik?” (1984) 10 De Rebus 478; Kleyn Die 
mandament van spolie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 323-331. See also Pienaar v Matjhabeng Plaaslike 
Munisipaliteit (3883/2012) 2012 ZAFSHC 213 (22 November 2012) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/
cases/ZAFSHC/2012/213.html> (accessed 25-02-2014). 
41 Motswagae v Rustenberg Local Municipality 2013 2 SA 613 (CC) paras 12-13.
42 Para 15. 
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that they were suffering irreparable harm as a result of interference with that 
occupation; and that there were no alternative remedies available to them.43
This judgment is interesting when viewed from a remedial perspective. This 
decision again concerns an eviction from property in instances where proper 
procedure was not followed in order to adequately give effect to section 26(3). 
An interdict was sought and granted, which highlighted the infringement of 
the constitutional right. The Court found that the constitutional right not to 
be arbitrarily evicted from one’s home is sufficient for purposes of the first 
requirement for an interdict – namely proof of a clear right.
This decision seems to be in line with an approach that advocates greater 
pioneering on the part of courts when it comes to remedies to defend constitutional 
rights. For instance, Liebenberg contends that courts should be innovative about 
the remedies that they adopt to protect socio-economic rights,44 and suggests a 
number of remedies that may be implemented in order to ensure that these rights 
are adequately given effect to in terms of the Constitution.45 In this context, she 
maintains that “innovative responses are required which incorporate, but also 
transcend, the traditional repertoire of private law remedies”.46 Trengove makes 
the same arguments in this regard.47 It seems as though this type of approach, 
which essentially ensures that the judiciary is entrusted with a wide discretion 
to ensure that socio-economic rights are effectively protected, would support 
the outcomes in both Tswelopele and Schubart Park in so far as the respective 
courts sought to adequately give effect to constitutional rights that were clearly 
infringed when eviction legislation was disregarded.
Liebenberg has made a compelling argument for a more active role for the 
judiciary in the exercise of aligning the private law doctrines and rules with the 
new normative value system underpinned by the Constitution.48 She asserts 
that until the legal culture – which is grounded in the classical liberal tradition 
that advocates minimal state intervention and judicial interference – is freed 
from this bondage and focused towards the new value system reinforced by the 
Constitution, there will be methodological and ideological barriers that stand 
in the way of application of socio-economic rights to private law rules and 
doctrines.49 Relying on Karl Klare50 and Van der Walt,51 Liebenberg argues 
that there is a disjuncture between the legal culture that dominates South 
African law and the normative value system grounded in the Constitution.52 
Accordingly, she maintains that this plays a role in the question of whether it 
would be appropriate to develop an existing common-law remedy in order to 
43 Para 18.
44 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 75, where Liebenberg asserts that courts should be creative when 
seeking to remedy the defects causing constitutional infringement. Therefore, courts are not limited to 
striking down the legislation “once and for all”.
45 Ch 8.
46 379.
47 Trengove (1991) ESR Review 9.
48 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 375.
49 339-341.
50 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146-188.
51 AJ van der Walt “Legal History, Legal Culture and Transformation in a Constitutional Democracy” 
(2006) 12 Fundamina 1-47.
52 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 340.
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give effect to constitutional rights and values as opposed to developing a new 
remedy in terms of the Constitution.53 Arguably, in her view, the only way 
to ensure that the ideals of the Constitution are fostered is through a more 
active role for the judiciary in ensuring that private law doctrines and rules are 
brought in line with the vision of transformative constitutionalism.54
If one considers decisions like Tswelopele and Schubart Park – and perhaps 
others like Marlboro Crisis Committee v City of Johannesburg55 – it is clear 
that the concerns highlighted by Liebenberg are noteworthy. Perhaps it is time 
to rethink (and to the extent that we have done so, then we should restate) the 
role of common-law remedies in a constitutional dispute, especially because 
it is evident from cases like Tswelopele and Schubart Park that it is unclear 
when courts will develop an existing common-law remedy in line with the 
Constitution or rather produce a new constitutional remedy. This becomes 
even trickier in instances where legislation exists to ostensibly give effect to 
the rights, but probably does not adequately do so.56 It would probably be wise 
to take a step back and rehearse some of the provisions in the Constitution 
that offer clarity in terms of the constitutional mandate on courts regarding 
the relationship between the common law and the Constitution when suitable 
remedies are sought. I deal with this aspect in the following part by setting out 
the provisions of the Constitution that are specifically relevant in the quest for 
finding proper remedies for constitutional infringement.
3  Constitutional provisions
The Constitution contains numerous provisions that may be of assistance 
when dealing with the question of the appropriate source of law in the case 
of remedies, where a constitutional right is infringed. As a starting point, 
section 2 provides that the “Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic” 
and that “all law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid”.57 Furthermore, the 
same section provides that obligations that are imposed by the Constitution 
must be fulfilled.58 It is arguable that the law in place to regulate evictions – 
namely PIE – presents shortcomings in the eviction of unlawful occupiers that 
renders the legislation unconstitutional.59 It may be in exactly these instances 
that a litigant is forced to pursue common-law remedies, because “[i]n light 
of PIE’s shortcomings in this context and the limited resources of unlawful 
53 336.
54 For the coining of the term and its original intended meaning, see Klare (1998) SAJHR 150. Klare 
elaborates that “[b]y transformative constitutionalism I mean a long-term project of constitutional 
enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical 
context of conducive political developments) to transforming a country’s political and social institutions 
and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction”.
55 (29978/12) 2012 ZAGPJHC 187 (7 September 2012) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/
ZAGPJHC/2012/187.pdf> (accessed 25-02-2014). 
56 Boggenpoel & Pienaar (2013) De Jure 1018.
57 S 2 of the Constitution.
58 S 2.
59 Boggenpoel & Pienaar (2013) De Jure 1018. Although Pienaar and I do not investigate the constitutionality 
of PIE as a result of its shortcoming, we do discuss the likelihood that, as a result of its shortcoming, 
there may be instances where PIE fails to adequately provide the substantive and procedural safeguards 
required by s 26(3) of the Constitution. 
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occupiers generally, one sure way to force all role players to participate in a legal 
process, to be played out in a formal, legal forum, is to claim the mandament 
van spolie”.60 Furthermore, still with regard to section 2 of the Constitution, 
the conduct of a municipality when it evicts unlawful occupiers without due 
process is arguably outside the ambit of PIE and certainly is outside of such 
municipality’s obligations as stipulated in section 152 of the Constitution.61 
In this regard, it is clear that local government has a constitutional obligation 
to ensure that they “react to and deal with evictions”62 in a constitutionally 
compliant manner. For one, it means that steps taken in relation to the homeless 
must be reasonable;63 and that the values enshrined in the Constitution should 
underscore evictions so that they take place in a humane way.64
Section 8 of the Constitution may also be helpful with the problem of 
identifying the appropriate source of law where remedies are concerned. 
Section 8(3) specifically deals with the application of a provision of the Bill of 
Rights and commands:
“When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection 
(2), a court – (a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, 
the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and (b) may develop 
rules of the common law to limit the right provided that the limitation is in accordance with section 
36(1).”65
Another important provision of the Constitution that can assist in 
understanding how the sources of law should be interpreted is section 38, 
which states that:
“Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the 
Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including 
a declaration of rights.”66
Section 39 of the Constitution is another provision that is important in this 
regard. Section 39(2) requires that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and 
when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or 
forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”.
The final provision that is important when establishing appropriate remedies 
in light of the Constitution is section 172. The power of a court – specifically 
with regard to constitutional matters – is set out in this section. This provision 
60 Boggenpoel & Pienaar (2013) De Jure 1021.
61 For a discussion of the duties and responsibilities of local government in the eviction of unlawful 
occupiers, see J van Wyk “The Role of Local Government in Evictions” (2011) 21 PELJ 49-83. 
62 51. As Van Wyk points out, municipalities are obliged in terms of s 7(2) of the Constitution to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights; and in terms of s 10 to give effect to the human 
dignity of every person.
63 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 
2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 17.
64 See Van Wyk (2011) PELJ 72.
65 S 8(3) of the Constitution (emphasis added).
66 S 38 (emphasis added). The provision goes further to stipulate:
“The persons who may approach a court are – (a) anyone acting in their own interest; (b) anyone acting 
on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; (c) anyone acting as a member of, or in 
the interest of, a group or class of persons; (d) anyone acting in the public interest; and (e) an association 
acting in the interest of its members.” See s 38 of the Constitution.
84 STELL LR 2014 1
Stellenbosch_Law_Review_2014-1_Text.indd   84 2014/05/06   10:45 AM
is crucial when analysing the question of sources of law as they pertain to 
remedies. Section 172(1) states:
“When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court – (a) must declare that any law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including – (i) an order limiting the retrospective 
effect of the declaration of invalidity; and (ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any 
period and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.”67
It is clear that the matrix of provisions listed above provide a (constitutionally 
mandated) framework in terms of which the sources of law should be 
applied in order to ensure that an appropriate remedy for the infringement 
of constitutional rights is obtained. However, it is evident from the cases 
discussed in the preceding parts that the question concerning the appropriate 
source of law in instances where more than one remedy may be applicable in 
eviction law remains a thorny and unclear issue.
In light of the provisions listed above, a few observations are warranted 
with regard to evictions and the remedies that are ordinarily used in these 
instances. Firstly, despite the fact that section 2 demands that obligations 
listed in the Constitution should be fulfilled, municipalities are still evicting 
(or constructively evicting) occupiers in contravention of section 26(3). 
Secondly, notwithstanding section 8(3)(a), which instructs courts to apply or if 
necessary develop the common law if legislation does not exist to adequately 
give effect to a right in the Constitution, common-law remedies are neither 
being applied nor being developed in line with the Constitution in these 
particular instances. In this regard, it is clear that parties elect to proceed with 
common-law remedies in instances where constitutional rights are infringed. 
Interestingly, litigants opt to invoke the common-law remedies regardless of 
the fact that legislation has been enacted to give effect to the constitutional 
provision purportedly infringed. The third observation is that courts seem to 
be reluctant to engage in the exercise of considering the common-law remedies 
in light of, and in line with, the Constitution. What is clear is that courts will 
opt for direct reliance on a constitutional provision to found a remedy, rather 
than engaging with the more difficult task of establishing how the remedies 
should be seen in relation to one another; and when it should be possible (if 
at all) to advance sufficient arguments in favour of developing a common-
law remedy to bring it in line with the Constitution. This is most pertinently 
illustrated in Tswelopele, where Cameron JA (as he then was) highlighted:
“I do not think that formulating an appropriate constitutional remedy in this case requires us to seize 
upon a common law analogy and force it to perform a constitutional function.”68
Statements like these illuminate the need to rethink the interplay between 
common-law remedies and constitutional ones when evictions happen without 
proper procedures. It forces us to ask important questions about the sustained 
relevance of common-law (or as Trengove puts it, conventional) remedies, 
67 S 172 (emphasis added). 
68 Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2007 6 SA 511 (SCA) 
para 26 (emphasis added).
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where constitutional rights are impacted.69 The questions that I highlighted in 
the introductory paragraph become relevant in light of the above extract from 
Tswelopele: The question that seems to have become relevant is whether there 
is – or should be – a methodological approach in determining the decision of 
which remedy to apply for to ensure that constitutional rights are adequately 
given effect to. This has become especially important in instances where more 
than one remedy deriving from more than one source of law could apply in a 
particular case. Are litigants free to choose common-law remedies in instances 
where (constitutional) rights are infringed, and in response to that, are courts 
able to deny those remedies and rather create constitutional ones instead? It 
has become critical to consider the place (or role) of common-law remedies 
in a constitutional dispute. Additionally, it has become essential to determine 
the possibility of direct reliance on a constitutional right (to create a remedy) 
in applications brought purely on the basis of common-law remedies. In light 
of the statement made in Tswelopele, these questions require reconsideration 
of the way we approach remedies in instances where a public body neglects to 
follow the procedures set out in PIE.
Before I reflect on the importance of thinking about the way we approach 
remedies in contemporary South African law, I will highlight some views 
on the link between the sources of law. I also wish to turn to some decisions 
that have attempted to steer the question of the interplay between the sources 
of law (specifically with regard to remedies) in a particular direction. Both 
the judgments and the various observations emphasised are valuable when 
attempting to place common-law, statutory and constitutional remedies in 
perspective.
4  Thinking about the way we approach remedies
A lot of what is done in property law (especially in relation to finding 
remedies for violations of rights) is essentially targeted at the stabilising role 
the discipline aims to fulfil in society.70 In “Property Outlaws”, Peñalver 
and Katyal highlight that property law is essentially structured around this 
stability.71 However, they also contend:
“[L]aw-breakers [including unlawful occupiers] have played integral roles in producing a system 
of property that is characterised by a complex and subtle contradiction: it is at once stable, perhaps 
even essentially so and yet this seemingly ordered system at the same time masks a pervasive but 
constructive instability that is necessary to prevent the entire edifice from becoming outdated.”72
69 Boggenpoel & Pienaar (2013) De Jure 998-1021.
70 EM Peñalver & SK Katyal “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 U Pa L Rev 1095 1097.
71 1133.
72 1098. Interestingly, Peñalver and Katyal point out the “powerful, and at times ironic, role of the lawbreaker 
in the process of fostering the evolution of property”. For an interesting (law and economics) perspective 
of property outlaws, see LA Fennel “Order with Outlaws?” (2007) 156 U Pa L Rev 269 278. She writes 
that “[t]he work of refining property law to strike the right balance between access and exclusion is always 
ongoing, and Peñalver and Katyal skillfully show us that outlaws can offer useful, if unconventional, 
guidance”. Also in the context of outlaws, Van der Walt writes that “[t]o imagine the transformation that 
is visible only in refusal of this kind [refusal of shallow transformation], we need to think through, and 
past, and outside the law, visualising ways in which refusal can possibly make new law from the pain and 
courage of outlaws”. AJ van der Walt “Property and Refusal” in K van Marle (ed) Refusal, Transition and 
Post-apartheid Law (2009) 53.
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In the South African context, Willis J (delivering a judgment on the 
potential eviction of a group of unlawful occupiers) remarked that reliability 
and predictability are central virtues in (property) law and therefore there is 
only one remedy for unlawful occupation, and that is eviction.73 It is therefore 
not surprising that Van der Walt writes that “[e]viction is a powerful legal 
instrument: a remedy with which a landowner can enforce her superior right to 
exclusive possession against almost any occupier”.74 Borrowing from Singer 
and Underkuffler, Van der Walt points out that the presumptive power of 
ownership is a central feature of the right to evict.75 Although this may be the 
case, the new normative framework underpinned by the Constitution requires 
a new paradigm within which evictions are to take place.76 The legislative 
framework (PIE) aims to incorporate the owner’s right to exclude (which is 
strengthened by section 25) and the interests of the unlawful occupiers not 
to be unlawfully evicted (as buttressed by section 26(3)).77 Consequently, 
as Pienaar explains in the context of unlawful occupation and eviction, 
“[t]he ‘contravention paradigm’, which was founded on private ownership 
rights and controls and powers of Government, had [in terms of the 
constitutional intervention] been replaced by a human rights paradigm”.78 The 
new eviction paradigm79 (or human rights paradigm)80 is further bolstered by 
Constitutional Court decisions that prescribe the manner in which evictions 
should take place in light of the Constitution.81 Therefore, it is clear that in the 
new constitutional dispensation the “perspective of the outsider, the fringe 
dweller … the weak and the marginalised”82 is taken into consideration before 
summary eviction is ordered.
This new standard pertaining to evictions is for the most part accepted 
and confirmed by courts.83 However, Michelman observes that “[q]uestions 
abound about whether the activities of South African courts, over these past 
eighteen years on the Constitution’s watch, have been fully hospitable to the 
achievement of equality, democracy, and social justice as envisaged by the 
73 Emfuleni Local Municipality v Builders Advancement Services CC 2010 4 SA 133 (GSJ).
74 AJ van der Walt “Housing Rights in the Intersection between Expropriation and Eviction Law” in L 
Fox-O’Mahony & JA Sweeney (eds) The Idea of Home in Law: Displacement and Dispossession (2011) 55 
55. 
75 55. See also JW Singer Entitlement – The Paradoxes of Property (2000) 3; LS Underkuffler The Idea of 
Property: Its Meaning and Power (2003) 65-70.
76 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 311-316. 
77 Preamble to PIE.
78 Pienaar Land Reform ch 10 (forthcoming). Pienaar explains that whereas the owner’s rights in the 
contravention paradigm ordinarily (and automatically) trumped that of the unlawful occupiers’, that is 
not the case according to the (new) human rights paradigm.
79 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 338.
80 Pienaar Land Reform ch 10 (forthcoming).
81 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea 
Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC); Residents of 
Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC).
82 Van der Walt “Property and Refusal” in Refusal, Transition and Post-apartheid Law 54.
83 There are two decisions that I have come across where the approach to evictions in the new constitutional 
dispensation is questionable. See Emfuleni Local Municipality v Builders Advancement Services CC 
2010 4 SA 133 (GSJ); Marlboro Crisis Committee v City of Johannesburg (29978/12) 2012 ZAGPJHC 
187 (7 September 2012) SAFLII. See also A Walters “A Balancing Act between Owners and Occupants: 
Is PIE Constitutional?” (2013) 22 De Rebus 22-25, in which the author raised scepticism about PIE’s 
constitutionality.
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Constitution”.84 This is no doubt attributed to the fact that in certain instances 
faith in a “profoundly equal, profoundly democratic South African society” 
is contested because – as Michelman so aptly puts it – “[f]aith is one thing, 
practice is another, and the Constitution in practice can support our faith only 
insofar as its juridical side can and does work in harmony with its substantive 
visionary side”.85 This is exactly the argument that Karl Klare previously 
made, when he pointed out:
“I identify a ‘disconnect’ between the Constitution’s transformative aspirations and the conservative 
character of South African legal culture. The claim is that, regardless of their political leanings, all 
participants within a legal culture are to some extent influenced and constrained by it to produce ideas 
and outcomes that are or might be different from the ideas and outcomes that would arise were they 
participants in a different or a more plural or conflictual legal culture. The descriptive point is that 
legal culture and socialisation constrain legal outcomes quite irrespective of the substantive mandates 
entrenched in the constitutions and legislation.”86
The points that Michelman and Klare raise would indeed be cause for concern 
if the type of analysis that focuses on determining whether unlawful occupiers 
who were illegally evicted are able to successfully rely on the mandament van 
spolie, deviates markedly from the vision of what the Constitution is supposed 
to substantively do for the holders of newly established constitutional rights. I 
make this contention on the basis of two arguments.
Firstly, where an illegal eviction has allegedly taken place, an application 
based on the spoliation remedy arguably shifts the analysis (and focus) away 
from the actual issue in these cases, which is that section 26(3) rights were 
violated when PIE proceedings were disregarded. I should add a qualification 
here; this is assuming that the violation of section 26(3) is in no way taken into 
consideration in the decision of whether to apply the remedy in light of the 
Constitution or to develop it to bring the remedy in line with the Constitution. 
Given Tswelopele and Schubart Park, the practise seems to be to leave 
the common law (remedy) “as is” and to rather look in the direction of the 
Constitution to establish a remedy. Therefore, in so far as the violation of 
section 26(3) is disregarded in purely mandament van spolie applications, one 
would probably have to approach the common-law remedy in this context 
with circumspection.87
Secondly, focusing on the two requirements for the mandament van spolie 
fails to adequately consider whether the remedy could actually give the 
unlawful occupiers what (we presume) they really wanted, which was suitable 
protection of constitutional rights. One concern in this regard is the extent to 
which the occupiers really only wanted temporary restoration of the property 
84 Michelman (2013) Stell LR 246.
85 245 (emphasis added). 
86 Klare (1998) SAJHR 151.
87 This was emphasised clearly in the recent decision of Marlboro Crisis Committee v City of Johannesburg 
(29978/12) 2012 ZAGPJHC 187 (7 September 2012) SAFLII, which was brought purely on the basis of the 
mandament van spolie and decided on that basis as well. This was despite the fact that the applicants had 
contended that what had happened when the police removed the unlawful occupiers from the properties 
(and dismantled their shacks) was eviction. The respondents vehemently denied that eviction and 
demolition in terms of s 26(3) of the Constitution had occurred in terms of which PIE would have been 
applicable. See Marlboro Crisis Committee v City of Johannesburg (29978/12) 2012 ZAGPJHC 187 (7 
September 2012) SAFLII para 26.
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to the limited extent provided by (a narrow and very restricted reading of) the 
scope of the mandament van spolie; an approach often adopted by the courts 
when the remedy is employed in these circumstances.88
In light of the stifling effect that reliance on common-law remedies could 
have on the constitutional vision of how evictions should take place in the South 
Africa we currently live in, it is probably advisable to resist the “gravitational 
pull”89 towards common-law remedies in these instances before (and unless) 
two separate (but related) questions are settled. Arguably, the answer to these 
questions should determine whether common-law remedies ought to still be 
relevant in constitutional disputes.
The first question is the extent to which the legislation that regulates how 
evictions should take place in South Africa was enacted to give effect to the 
constitutional right not to be arbitrarily evicted from one’s home. Another 
important question is the extent to which the legislation (PIE) was enacted to 
replace the common law.
Regarding the first question, it is clear from the preamble of PIE that it 
was indeed enacted to give effect to section 26(3).90 This is evident from the 
words: “and whereas no one may be evicted from their home, or have their 
home demolished without an order of court made after considering all the 
relevant circumstances”.91
In terms of the question of whether PIE was enacted to replace the common 
law, the starting place should be section 4(1) of PIE, which prescribes that 
“[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common law, the 
provisions of the section apply to proceedings by an owner or person in charge 
of land for the eviction of an unlawful occupier”. There are also instances 
where case law has provided clarity concerning the appropriate connection 
between the different sources of law in the case of remedies. For instance, 
88 It seems as though courts have generally been uncomfortable with applying the mandament to regain 
possession of unlawfully occupied property even though, in principle, ius possidendi is not required in 
terms of the remedy; this was even the case before the Constitution was enacted. In some instances, it was 
because it was impossible to restore possession when the property was destroyed. See Sonnekus (1978) 
TSAR 172; De Waal (1984) THRHR 118; DG Kleyn “Die mandament van spolie as Besitsremedie” (1986) 
19 De Jure 1 10. For differing opinions, see AJ van der Walt “Nog eens Naidoo v Moodley – ‘n Repliek” 
(1984) 47 THRHR 429 435; Taitz (1981) SALJ 36; JE Scholtens “Law of Property (including mortgage and 
pledge)” (1996) ASSAL 221 222. There are also instances where the remedy’s requirements were simply 
applied in a restrictive fashion, effectively precluding the remedy’s application. For example, in Marlboro 
Crisis Committee v City of Johannesburg (29978/12) 2012 ZAGPJHC 187 (7 September 2012) SAFLII, 
the requirement of “peaceful and undisturbed possession” was required to be stable, which the unlawful 
occupiers were unable to prove. Consequently, the remedy could not be granted to give the occupiers relief 
for the unlawful conduct of the police who had neglected to follow PIE. 
89 See Michelman (2013) Stell LR 245 246 for the coining of this term in this context and for an exemplary 
(critical) account of the courts’ conservative impulse or gravity against questioning common-law 
doctrines and regimes. He states:
“My question points toward an inclination of lawyers to defer to the common law, including a 
reluctance of lawyers to conclude that the words of a statute, or of the Constitution, have actually 
meant to command a deviation from the common law.” (247.)
See also FI Michelman “Comment: The Common Law as Baseline? (A Reading of the Judgments of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa in the case of Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South 
Africa)” (2012) SSRN 12-40 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2155898> (accessed 
01-09-2013), where he further develops his argument of the common law forming the basis of justified 
expectation against which all government action is measured to determine whether it is permissible.
90 Van der Walt Property in the Margins 147, 151-153.
91 See also Van der Walt Property and Constitution 41 (specifically n 68).
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in City of Cape Town v Rudolph92 (“Rudolph”), the Cape Provincial Division 
ruled that the mandament van spolie is not available to landowners who wish 
to evict unlawful occupiers.93
In Rudolph, the City of Cape Town applied for the mandament van spolie 
to regain possession of its property that was unlawfully occupied by the 
respondents. The Court emphasised that although the spoliation remedy is 
in principle also available to regain possession in the case of immovable 
property, the applicant municipality was not free to choose to invoke 
common-law remedies – specifically the mandament van spolie – to evict 
the unlawful occupiers because PIE was specifically enacted to regulate 
eviction law. Therefore, in instances where a local authority as the owner of 
immovable property wishes to restore possession of property, it is barred from 
using common-law remedies to do so. It must follow the measures set out in 
PIE to ensure that section 26(3) of the Constitution is adequately given effect 
to. This was recently confirmed in the Eastern Cape High Court decision of 
Afzal v Kalim94 (“Afzal”), where Plasket J reiterated that an application for the 
mandament van spolie could be fatally defective if the provisions of PIE were 
applicable to the situation and an applicant nonetheless sought the common-
law remedy of the mandament van spolie to ensure undisturbed possession of 
his home.
In Afzal, the applicant obtained an order for the mandament van spolie in 
the court a quo and wished to confirm that order in the Eastern Cape High 
Court. The respondent raised two defences against the application. Firstly, she 
argued that she and the applicant had reached an agreement concerning her 
return to the house,95 and secondly the respondent argued that the application 
was fatally defective because the applicant neglected to follow the procedures 
of PIE in order to evict her.96 With regard to the second defence, which is the 
one that is interesting for present purposes, Plasket J questioned whether the 
application for the spoliation remedy was fatally defective because of non-
compliance with PIE.97
It was confirmed that proceedings as set out in PIE (specifically in section 
4) should be followed in the case of eviction of unlawful occupiers. It was clear 
in Afzal that eviction proceedings were not followed by the applicant. Instead, 
he elected to seek the mandament van spolie to obtain undisturbed possession 
of the property. The Court examined whether this choice of remedy was 
permissible in light of the fact that what the applicant was really trying to do 
was to evict the respondent from the premises. On the basis of the precedent 
set in Rudolph, the Court in Afzal correctly emphasised that “the mandament 
van spolie cannot be used to circumvent the protection given to occupiers of 
92 2004 5 SA 39 (C).
93 City of Cape Town v Rudolph 2004 5 SA 39 (C).
94 2013 6 SA 176 (ECP). 
95 The first defence was based on a dispute of facts, which the Court dismissed because the respondent’s 
version of the fact that there was agreement between her and the applicant was, according to the Court, 
“palpably implausible, far-fetched and untenable”. See Afzal v Kalim 2013 6 SA 176 (ECP) para 17.
96 Para 2.
97 Para 21.
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homes by PIE”.98 The Court concluded that PIE was not applicable on the 
basis of the facts of the case because the respondent was unable to prove that 
the house was her home, even though she was the co-owner of it.99 However, 
it is clear that the basis for the reasoning of the Court was that had PIE been 
applicable in the case, the application may indeed have been defective, as 
the application of the mandament van spolie would specifically be precluded 
because of the rule established in Rudolph.
As emphasised earlier, the Rudolph guideline instructs that in so far as PIE 
was specifically enacted to regulate a particular situation (namely, the eviction 
of unlawful occupiers), the owner is not able to invoke the spoliation remedy 
in order to achieve the same result. It should be noted that Rudolph was 
decided (and section 4(1) of PIE is written) primarily from the perspective of 
the owner or person in charge wishing to evict, and not from the perspective 
of the evictee who has been unlawfully evicted. This observation may change 
everything. However, I suggest that in so far as PIE was enacted to ensure that 
evictions take place in line with section 26(3), it simply must be assumed that 
the rule could find application regardless of whether the litigant is the person 
evicted (like in Tswelopele and Schubart Park) or the one wishing to evict (as 
illustrated in Rudolph). Consequently, it seems inevitable that the rule could 
apply to indicate a “fatally defective application” in (all) instances where a 
common-law remedy is sought if there is legislation specifically enacted to 
regulate a particular area of law.
It is clear that a similar type of rule already applies in the context of the 
relationship between the common-law remedy of the rei vindicatio and PIE. 
In this regard, Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert question the impact of the 
constitutional right not to be arbitrarily evicted from one’s home (section 
26) and its concomitant legislation (PIE) on the common-law remedy of the 
rei vindicatio.100 The authors highlight that the constitutional dispensation 
brought with it many questions concerning issues of applicability of different 
sources of law to eviction cases. They ask vital questions about the source of 
law applicable in the case of evictions, namely:
“(a)  When is the common law (rei vindicatio) applicable and when does one use the provisions of the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act?
(b)  What is the impact of section 26(3) on the application of the rei vindicatio, if at all?
(c)  Which relevant circumstances have to be considered and whose responsibility is it to bring it to 
the attention of the court considering the eviction order?”101
Furthermore, it is suggested by these authors that:
“[O]ne would first have to determine when the provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act 
are applicable. If the Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act and other legislation dealing with eviction are 
not applicable, then the common law would apply. One would then have to determine whether the 
98 Para 24.
99 Para 28.
100 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 247.
101 247.
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application of the rei vindicatio would be used in much the same way as it has been applied for the 
past decades before the Constitution commenced.”102
If one considers that “the aim of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act is 
to amend the common law”103 in the sense that the common law is excluded 
as far as eviction is concerned, it is interesting to note the number of cases in 
which eviction orders are still granted without any reference to PIE.104
There are also other contexts in which the same type of guideline about the 
relationship between the sources of law, as shown in Rudolph, was illustrated. 
For instance in the context of administrative law, O’Regan J stated in Bato 
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism105 that 
in so far as the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”) 
was enacted to give effect to section 33 of the Constitution, litigants who 
seek to review administrative action should do so in terms of PAJA and not 
the common law.106 Therefore, the case illustrates that claimants who wish to 
protect their rights in terms of section 33 of the Constitution should not do so 
in terms of the common-law remedy of judicial review, but rather through the 
legislation (specifically section 6 of PAJA) that was enacted to give effect to 
the constitutional right. This type of reasoning shows that in instances where 
legislation does exist, it should indicate the choice of remedy that the litigant 
invokes.107
In his review of the Constitutional Court decisions in the 2007 term, Van 
der Walt observed a pattern concerning the choice of the source of law when 
conflicts arise about a right.108 He uses these observations to develop the 
subsidiarity theory, which consists of a set of principles aimed at providing a 
“structure [for] the choice of the source of law that is most likely to promote 
the development of a system of law that displays the desired features [of a 
single system of law] and that avoids the unwanted outcomes [illustrated 
when democracy is disregarded]”.109 The principles are important to avoid 
what Karl Klare has subsequently described as “proliferate separate tracks or 
sub-systems of law … grounded on the Constitution itself and on legislation 
or the common law”.110 Van der Walt states:
102 247 (footnotes omitted). The discussion continues with a section on what PIE was enacted to do and 
achieve.
103 253; Van der Walt Property in the Margins 151 (“The Act explicitly overrides the common law right to 
evict and therefore one might expect that it would simply replace the common law”).
104 For contrasting views on the relationship between the common law, PIE and s 26(3) of the Constitution, 
see ABSA Bank Ltd v Amod 1999 2 All SA 423 (W); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA); Ndlovu v 
Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 1 SA 113 (SCA). See also Van der Walt Property in the Margins 152-153. See 
specifically Pienaar Land Reform ch 10 (forthcoming), in which Pienaar discusses a number of decisions 
in which PIE was ignored in the granting of an eviction order.
105 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). Van der Walt argues that the principle observed in the case of Bato Star Fishing (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) in the context of administrative 
law could be used in instances where PIE is applicable to prevent direct application of common-law 
remedies. See AJ van der Walt “Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term” (2008) 
1 CCR 77 104.
106 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 25.
107 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 41.
108 Van der Walt (2008) CCR 77-128.
109 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 35. See also Van der Walt (2008) CCR 77-128.
110 KE Klare “Legal Subsidiarity & Constitutional Rights: A Reply to AJ van der Walt” (2008) 1 CCR 129 
134 (emphasis added).
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“Subsidiarity should be understood in terms of its constitutional purpose and justification, as that has 
been spelled out in 2007: to preserve the constitutional power and obligation of the courts to control 
the constitutional validity of legislation, while at the same time paying due respect to the democratic 
power and legitimacy of policy makers and legislatures in giving effect to their reform obligations.”111
And again:
“[T]he subsidiarity principles should not be seen or used as restrictions upon constitutional review, 
interpretation of legislation or development of the common law; they indicate an angle of approach, 
a starting point for reflection, a methodological discipline to avoid arbitrary resort to established and 
comfortable ways of thinking and not a general avoidance of constitutional influence.”112
With this purpose in mind, the subsidiary principles can be explained as 
follows: The first principle provides that if legislation has specifically been 
enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, conflicts about the right should 
be adjudicated with reference to the legislation.113 Direct reliance on the 
constitutional provision is therefore precluded.114 However, direct reliance on 
a constitutional right is possible in instances where a litigant wishes to attack 
the constitutional validity of the legislation. The second subsidiarity principle 
requires that if legislation exists to give effect to a constitutional provision, 
parties should not be free to rely on the common law to bring their cause of 
action. Consequently, according to these principles, a litigant should not rely 
on the constitutional provision directly,115 or on the common law to protect 
against infringement of the right, but should – where legislation exists – rely 
on that legislation to protect their constitutional rights.116 With this set of 
subsidiarity principles – with its proviso – Van der Walt considers the proper 
relationship between three sources of law, namely the Constitution, legislation 
and the common law.
Interestingly in this regard, Michelman – who is very critical of South 
African judges and lawyers’ conservative approach to existing common-law 
doctrine – nonetheless concedes:
“In the case where a statutory path is open, if a court takes the common-law path instead, that to some 
degree wastes, while it also spurns and belittles, the parliamentary contribution. Other things being 
equal … that seems obviously a bad thing to do.”117
Similarly, Liebenberg acknowledges that there are sound justifications for 
preferring legislation to do the job of adequately giving effect to socio-economic 
rights, but she is mindful of the practical limits that taint the legislative branch 
of government.118 For that reason, she argues that where imperfect legislation 
exists because of these constraints, or where no legislation exists to protect 
111 Van der Walt (2008) CCR 126.
112 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 37.
113 35-39.
114 This principle was brought forth by the principle enunciated in the Constitutional Court decisions of 
South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) paras 51-52 and 
Minister of Health NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign and Another as 
Amici Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 437.
115 See Van der Walt (2008) CCR 100-103, where Van der Walt relies on South African National Defence 
Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) paras 51-52. 
116 See Van der Walt (2008) CCR 100-103, where Van der Walt relies on Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 25.
117 Michelman (2013) Stell LR 259 (original emphasis). 
118 S Liebenberg “The Application of Socio-economic Rights in Private law” (2008) TSAR 464 471.
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socio-economic rights, “litigants must look to the court according to section 
8(3) [of the Constitution] to find a remedy in terms of the existing common 
law or, where necessary, to develop a new constitutionally sourced remedy to 
give effect to the relevant constitutional rights”.119
In the case where PIE exists to replace the common law and give effect to 
section 26(3) rights, but for some reason does not adequately do so, I suggest 
that one would first have to look to the legislative branch to fix what needs to 
be mended. No doubt, the predicament concerning remedies as highlighted 
in the previous parts of the article certainly results from imperfect legislation 
aimed at regulating eviction law. Ideally, the Rudolph-guideline (as extended 
to evictees) would apply in the context of eviction law to ensure that because 
PIE was enacted to give effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution, litigants 
should rely on PIE in order to protect their constitutional right. Therefore, 
a complainant should not rely directly on section 26(3) or the common law 
to protect the right. However, the problem as indicated before is that PIE 
is commanding rather than responsive. Therefore, PIE cannot in itself ex 
post facto remedy an eviction that was not undertaken lawfully, because it 
provides no effective cure in instances where organs of state do not follow the 
procedures in terms of the legislation in order to evict the unlawful occupiers. 
There is of course section 8 of PIE, in terms of which criminal liability ensues 
in the case of non-compliance with the procedures of the Act; but this has 
never been argued or applied. As mentioned earlier, the conduct of an organ 
of state in instances where PIE proceedings were disregarded possibly falls 
outside of the ambit of the legislation and is ultra vires. The only way in which 
this conundrum will once and for all be solved (and will probably be the best 
solution in these instances) is if a litigant – in accordance with the proviso 
to the first subsidiarity principle highlighted by Van der Walt – attacks the 
validity of the legislation in so far as it does not adequately give effect to 
the constitutional right. An amended version of PIE is crucial so that the 
piece of legislation either incorporates stricter penalties in the case of non-
compliance with its provisions, or provides clearer guidelines in terms of 
remedial response in instances of non-fulfilment of the obligations imposed 
by it. However, this is probably only a medium (or even long) term solution. 
In the meantime, it is clear that appropriate remedial response still needs to be 
found for the situation where illegal evictions are occurring.
The question is: Does it actually matter whether an evictee who was 
unlawfully evicted chooses the mandament van spolie or relies directly 
on section 26(3) to argue that a new remedy in terms of the Constitution 
should be created? From a practical perspective, it is hard to see how the 
result when invoking the mandament van spolie and the outcome in the case 
where a constitutional remedy under section 26(3) is argued, are in principle 
119 472.
94 STELL LR 2014 1
Stellenbosch_Law_Review_2014-1_Text.indd   94 2014/05/06   10:45 AM
any different from each other.120 The spoliation remedy would arguably be 
invoked in these instances to simply place the occupiers in the position they 
were in prior to the unlawful dispossession. In doing so, questions relating 
to the merits of the dispute can be considered in later (lawful) eviction 
proceedings. In contrast, if one considers a constitutional remedy in terms 
of section 26(3), at best, this remedy should probably ensure that the illegal 
eviction is reversed and the occupiers are placed in a position whereby they 
can be subject to lawful eviction proceedings.121 Therefore, the mandament 
van spolie would inevitably fulfil the same role as a constitutional remedy in 
terms of section 26(3).122
That being said, it is not so much the practical implications that are 
particularly worrying with these decisions; I am more concerned with the 
underlying theoretical ideology of the case law that I discussed. I think it (really) 
does matter whether claimants choose to apply for common-law remedies 
or opt for direct reliance on constitutional rights to found constitutional 
remedies. Similarly, it certainly matters whether courts deliberately choose 
not to develop the common-law remedies in line with the Constitution, but 
instead decide to devise new constitutional remedies that purportedly exist 
parallel to the extant common-law ones.
In the absence of a specific remedy in PIE designed to restore the situations 
where local authorities illegally evict without following the procedures in the 
Act, courts should be careful not to simply disregard the application of the 
mandament for practical reasons, like the destruction of the building materials 
or the fact that the building may be unsuitable for habitation. It should be 
possible (and it is in fact constitutionally mandated)123 to develop the 
mandament to provide for the practical difficulties with applying the remedy 
in these instances. In this regard, I posit that it should be plausible to still keep 
120 It is important to note that the mandament van spolie would not be invoked in these instances to provide 
tenure security in the form of a permanent solution; in this regard, I recognise the inherent limitation to 
the mandament’s traditional application, especially in so far as the remedy is essentially temporary in 
nature and the merits of the dispute are irrelevant in the consideration of whether the remedy should be 
granted.
121 This is probably also a temporary solution in the sense that the possibility still exists that an eviction order 
can be granted during subsequent lawful eviction proceedings. It is doubtful whether a remedy based on 
direct reliance on s 26(3) of the Constitution would in any event ensure any form of permanent tenure 
security, unless it is supplemented to some extent with s 26(1) and/or 26(2).
122 There are, however, a few noteworthy remarks that should be made about the application of the mandament 
vis-à-vis the use of a constitutional remedy in terms of s 26(3) of the Constitution in this context. The 
merits of the dispute are irrelevant in mandament van spolie applications, whereas this restriction would 
not apply in the case of a s 26(3) constitutional remedy. This may mean that a broader spectrum of 
factors could be taken into consideration in terms of the constitutional remedy, which may perhaps be 
impermissible according to the mandament van spolie. However, it is not entirely clear which factors 
would be taken into consideration in order to decide whether a s 26(3) constitutional remedy should be 
granted. The onus of proof would presumably also be different depending on whether the mandament is 
sought as opposed to a constitutional remedy. Whereas possession and unlawful dispossession are the 
salient requirements in the case of the spoliation remedy, presumably one would have to prove illegal 
eviction from one’s home (or demolition thereof) to be successful with a constitutional remedy according 
to s 26(3). An advantage that is of course applicable in the case of the mandament is the fact that it is a 
speedy remedy, which may be beneficial considering the illegal evictions from homes and the need for 
swift repossession. See Mans v Marais 1932 CPD 352 356.
123 See part 3 above.
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the mandament van spolie as the residuary source of law in the case where 
PIE falls short.
Where the mandament van spolie is not available in a particular case 
because of these practical difficulties, it is important to keep in mind that 
courts have a duty to remedy the situation through the development of the 
common law. Although it is impossible to determine beforehand when 
common-law remedies should be developed in line with the Constitution, the 
mandate is clear: there is a duty on courts to ensure that “[w]hen interpreting 
any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights”.124 If this mandate is followed more clearly and consistently, 
one can only hope that this results in court decisions that are more principled 
and consistent.
5  Conclusion
Much of what has been discussed in this contribution is largely dependent 
on those who have already tried to figure out how to effectively deal with 
the way in which the changeover to a truly democratic society would affect 
the way we approach remedies for infringements of constitutional rights. 
What has been particularly striking for me is how the various approaches 
to the sources of law – when it comes to remedial options – are riddled with 
“complexity, nuance, and multiple perspectives” instead of “the standard, 
sanitised, starry-eyed accounts of our constitutional transition”.125
I have tried to identify one area of law where these complexities and 
nuances are particularly telling. Specifically in eviction law, it is clear that the 
relationship between the sources of law is uncertain for purposes of finding a 
remedy in the case of infringements of section 26(3). Although it would be rash 
to criticise PIE and forget the important role that it fulfils in post-Apartheid 
eviction law, I have tried to illustrate that where PIE falls short it is important 
to take stock of what the shortfall means in terms of remedies for occupiers 
who are illegally evicted. If this does not happen, we may invariably run the 
risk of applying the remedies in an instinctual manner, without thinking about 
what the Constitution means – and in fact prescribes – for the way we seek to 
give adequate protection to the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.
I questioned whether the rule enunciated in Rudolph – requiring that in 
instances where PIE exists to give effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution, 
a municipality cannot evict by using the mandament van spolie – could 
be expanded to remedies in general; this could help to explain a certain 
methodological approach that would assist with understanding how remedies 
from different sources of law should be approached in the new constitutional 
dispensation. In the context of illegal evictions, I argue that it should be 
impermissible to bypass the issue of abuses of section 26(3) by elaborate 
(often technical) discussions of the two requirements of the spoliation remedy, 
124 S 39(2) of the Constitution.
125 Botha “Refusal, Post-apartheid Constitutionalism” in Refusal, Transition and Post-apartheid Law 34.
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especially if no possibility is foreseen that the remedy could be viewed (or 
developed) in line with the Constitution. In this regard, it is suggested that in 
light of the fact that courts generally are quite restrictive in their application of 
the mandament van spolie in these instances, it should first be established to 
what extent PIE was meant to the replace the common law and was enacted to 
give effect to section 26(3). As illustrated, PIE was meant to fulfil both these 
purposes; therefore, the issue that should primarily have been questioned in 
Tswelopele and Schubart Park is the extent to which PIE falls short of its 
constitutional obligations, which may possibly require amendment.
To the extent that the legislation therefore does not adequately give effect to 
section 26(3) rights, in the interim the question still lingers concerning the use 
of the mandament van spolie by evictees who are unlawfully evicted. In the 
constitutional dispensation, the need to answer the question has perhaps been 
less pressing than in the pre-constitutional era because of the possibility of 
direct reliance on a constitutional right to found a remedy. The evictee arguably 
now has the possibility of two coinciding remedies, namely the mandament 
van spolie and a constitutional remedy under section 26(3). In this regard, I 
have tried to illustrate that both these remedies would in principle provide 
the same type of remedial content in the sense of ensuring that repossession 
takes place (thereby reversing the illegal eviction) so that the occupiers are 
(temporarily) placed in the position they were in prior to the illegal eviction 
(or dispossession) and the merits of the dispute can be decided in a subsequent 
eviction application. I argue that if we want to ensure that we have the types 
of decisions that give full effect to the rights as envisaged by the Constitution, 
we should not be too quick to discard of the possibility that the common-
law remedy could be invoked in the context of eviction. If the need arises 
to reconsider the common-law remedies in light of the Constitution (and to 
develop them in line with the Constitution) courts are not able to shy away 
from their obligation in terms of section 39(2). In this regard, simply choosing 
a method out of instinct and without proper reflection is not an option. It may 
seriously undermine the transformative thrust of the Constitution and force us 
to really reflect on how we view the sources of contemporary South African 
law in relation to one another.
It is clear that it is necessary to understand (and better explain) how the 
sources of law relate to one another in the search for suitable remedies for 
infringement of constitutional rights. I have done no more than flag some 
important issues that to my mind should be considered before responding to 
illegal evictions. I have certainly not provided (and did not attempt to provide) 
details of how appropriate legislation should be drafted or what possible 
penalties may be considered sufficient to deter illegal evictions from taking 
place. In this regard, my aim was modest. I simply join a number of other 
voices that call for deeper consideration about the starting point in these 
instances, so as to ensure adequate protection for constitutional rights. Perhaps 
this will place much needed method back into the madness that is occurring 
in eviction law at the moment. A starting point or approach “enables you to 
imagine yourself in a situation without its details… [o]therwise details can 
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chew away at your options”,126 or as Henk Botha so aptly reminds us; we 
should (perhaps) be:
“Resisting the temptation to plan everything ahead, to devise a strategy for every eventuality. 
Remaining alive to the possibility that things could be different. Savouring the passion of enormous 
possibility. And laughing at ourselves for the way in which, over time, our embrace of nuance, 
uncertainty and contradiction tends to solidify into new certainties, as the angle of approach hardens 
into full-blown strategies and programmes and imagination turns into inertia.”127
SUMMARY
The new constitutional dispensation brought with it (inevitably) large scale deviations in the way 
remedies in the context of evictions are applied in modern South African law. This article examines 
how the sources of law relate to one another in the search for suitable remedies for infringement of 
constitutional rights. Specifically in eviction law, it is clear that the relationship between the sources 
of law is uncertain for purposes of finding a remedy in the case of infringements of section 26(3) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”). The evictee arguably has 
the possibility of two coinciding remedies, namely the mandament van spolie and a constitutional 
remedy under section 26(3). The article shows that both these remedies would in principle provide the 
same type of remedial content in the sense of ensuring that repossession takes place (thereby reversing 
the illegal eviction) so that the occupiers are (temporarily) placed in the position they were in prior 
to the illegal eviction (or dispossession) and the merits of the dispute can be decided in a subsequent 
eviction application. Nonetheless, it is argued that in order to ensure the types of decisions that give 
full effect to the rights as envisaged by the Constitution, courts should not be too quick to discard of 
the possibility that the common-law remedy could be invoked in the context of eviction. If the need 
arises to reconsider the common-law remedies in light of the Constitution (and to develop them in line 
with the Constitution) courts are not able to shy away from their obligation in terms of section 39(2).
126 Ndebele The Cry of Winnie Mandela 81-82.
127 Botha “Refusal, Post-apartheid Constitutionalism” in Refusal, Transition and Post-apartheid Law 34.
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